By Connie Reguli.
By Connie Reguli.
By Connie Reguli
Many times, families are silenced by the Courts to prevent them from publishing their frustrations about Court proceedings. This type of restraint should not be allowed nor tolerated in our country. There are many cases prohibiting “prior restraint” when it come to our First Amendment freedoms.
In Federal Court, the implement “rules” against public dissemination of information about the case, presumably because it could affect the right of both parties to a fair and impartial jury. However, does social media really have such a broad reach to audiences that it would have a detrimental effect on a jury. And really, could this not be resolved in voir dire.
Recently, I was threatened on this very issue. I participate in social media platforms that are critical of the government and sometimes, challenge the operation of the Courts. In a pending Federal lawsuit, I made a disclosure about defendants regarding the corruption uncovered in this rural Tennessee county.
Within days, I received threatening letters claiming that Local Rule 83.04 prohibited such comments in social media.
So I found the reference below. In Ohio, the Federal Court has found this restriction to be unconstitutional………..Nice to Know.
Trial judges, the government, the lawyers and the public must tolerate robust and at times acrimonious or even silly public debate about litigation. The courts are public institutions funded with public revenues for the purpose of resolving public disputes, and the right of publicity concerning their operations goes to the heart of their function under our system of civil liberty. The courts have available other less restrictive approaches for insuring a fair trial. They may, for example, consider a change of venue or the sequestration of the jury or a searching voir dire examination of the jury.
The Court hereby finds that DR 7-107(G) is facially unconstitutional because it violates the over breadth doctrine as DR 7-107(G) is capable of being applied to punish attorneys for constitutionally protected speech or conduct and therefore, in the Court’s view, “reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.” Leonardson, 896 F.2d at 195. DR 7-107(G) has a chilling effect in that it prohibits attorney speech in civil litigation that is otherwise protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, the Court finds that DR 7-107(G) is over broad because it does not aim specifically at certain evils, but it sweeps within its reach other speech that is constitutionally protected. See Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 97.
The Court also finds that DR 7-107(G) is facially unconstitutional pursuant to the vagueness doctrine. DR 7-107(G) is void for vagueness since its provisions do not provide adequate warnings to all regarding what is permitted and what is proscribed by law. See Richardson v. City of South Euclid, 904 F.2d 1050, 1056 (6th Cir. 1990) (Merritt, C.J., dissenting); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108. Thus, like Rule 177 as construed in Gentile, DR 7-107(G) with its somewhat ambiguous categories “creates a trap for the wary as well as the unwary.” Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 1132. Moreover, DR 7-107(G) gives the disciplinary board considerable discretion in determining who will be disciplined and who will not be disciplined. Accordingly, DR 7-107(G) is void pursuant to the vagueness doctrine.
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division
September 30, 1991, Filed Case C-2-90-335
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has ruled that a civil litigant’s First Amendment rights were violated when a U.S. district court judge ordered him to stop writing letters to shareholders of a bank that had sued him. Sept 2019. Bank of Hope v. Chon.
By Connie Reguli
March 22, 2020, Arizona Supreme Court decided that where TPR is sought for nonabused children as well as an abused child, the court must find risk of harm to the nonabused children by clear and convincing evidence in the substantive grounds phase, not merely in the best interests phase.
“Thus, a juvenile court may terminate a parent’s rights to non-abused children under § 8-533(B)(2) only if the extrapolation of unfitness—the risk of harm to such children—is proven by clear and convincing evidence. No application of the statute may circumvent this fundamental constitutional requirement.”
“ In sum, a juvenile court’s extrapolation of parental unfitness will not pass constitutional muster under Santosky unless the risk of harm to non-abused children is proven by clear and convincing evidence.”
SANDRA R., SERGIO C., Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, M.R., F.M., J.M., Appellees., No. CV-19-0057-PR, 2020 WL 1161588, at *6 (Ariz. Mar. 11, 2020).
Contributors from Family Forward Project Ginnie Todd and Patty Hansen
Follow us on Family Forward Project on Facebook
Karabeika dismissed a juvenile case that had placed DHS as Kylee Dixon’s legal guardian. She will now be permitted to return to her mother’s care.
Kylee Dixon had surgery on Jan. 14 to remove a cancerous tumor from her liver. DHS said she is now cancer-free. The surgery, and the dismissal of the case, capped a months-long dispute between DHS and Christina Dixon over how to treat Kylee Dixon’s cancer diagnosis.
This is an important case for every American parent. You may be one hospital visit and one differing opinion away from the state intruding in what parental rights you think you have. Harming a child is NEVER okay but being forced into treatment is not the job of any government. What is the point of requiring patients to consent to treatment and acknowledge the risks and benefits, IF hospitals can force you into treatment under threat of removing your child and forcing you through a legal process that is not only secretive (confidential) but lacks due process and accountability. That battle will cost you upwards of $50,000 – 100,000 to defend your decision to get another opinion, or take a different treatment path, or simply honor your child’s wishes to not subject themselves to chemo or some other care. The system seems to have forgotten the practice of medicine makes no guarantees.
Feb 3 2020 Kylee Dixon returned to mother’s custody, judge dismisses DHS case. https://www.oregonlive.com/clackamascounty/2020/02/kylee-dixon-returned-to-mothers-custody-judge-dismisses-dhs-case.html
By Connie Reguli
“This bill simply closes the loophole in prohibiting foster parents from having inappropriate sexual contact with their foster kids.” GA state rep Ed Setzler.
On multiple occasions I have seen cases where kids in foster care are either victims of sexual assault or allowed to have sex with other kids in foster care. These kids are traumatized by abrupt removals from their homes.
2020 GA house bill 911.
Crimes and offenses; offenses of improper sexual conduct by a foster parent in the first and second degrees; provide
Current Status: House Passed/Adopted By Substitute
Official Summary: A BILL to be entitled an Act to amend Chapter 6 of Title 16, Article 2 of Chapter 3 of Title 35, Article 3 of Chapter 5 of Title 42, and Article 1 of Chapter 2 of Title 49 of the O.C.G.A., relating to sexual offenses, the Georgia Crime Information Center, conditions of detention generally, and general provisions regarding the Department of Human Services, respectively, so as to provide for the offenses of improper sexual conduct by a foster parent in the first and second degrees; to provide for related matters; to repeal conflicting laws; and for other purposes.Continue reading